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We study individual decision making in a lottery-choice task performed by three
subject populations: gamblers under psychological treatment (“addicts”), gamblers’
relatives (“victims”), and normal (as far as gambling is considered) individuals. We
find that addicts are willing to take less risk than normal individuals, but the large
majority of victims reports themselves unwilling to take any risk at all. Furthermore,
both addicts and victims maintain their choices invariant across different scenarios
concerning the risk-return tradeoff.





Since the late 40’s, individual decision making under risk has been one of the most pop-
ular issues studied by economists and psychologists. On one hand, theoretical analysis,
initially undertaken mostly by economists, has framed the basic problem as a generic
situation in which individuals choose among a number of probability-outcome pairs. On
the other hand, empirical contributions from both disciplines have adopted a variety of
methodologies. These include questionnaires, economic experiments and real-world data.
The most salient result across all these different methodologies is that decisions taken on
a risky environment are very sensitive to the framing of the problem, specially as far as
the outcome domain is concerned.
There is, therefore, a concern about the external validity of abstract lottery-choice
tasks. It is not clear whether behavior in such tasks reasonably predicts behavior in any
real world situation. A negative answer to this question could undermine the interest of
all efforts made so far in understanding human behavior in lottery-choice experiments.
An extreme and more focused version of this question is addressed in this paper. We
study population affected by gambling problems. Given that their lifes have been directly
or indirectly affected by a pathological attitude towards risky decision making, would that
person’s behavior in an abstract lottery-choice decision making task significantly deviate
from a “normal” subject’s behaviour? In what way?
In order to answer this question, we have faced a population of 82 subjects with
a hypothetical framing of the lottery-choice task introduced by Sabater & Georgantzís
[15] and further developed and discussed in Georgantzís et al. [8]. The test is designed
to capture two dimensions of a subject’s preferences towards risky choice. i) First, it
distinguishes between risk averse and risk neutral/risk loving subjects. ii) Second, the
test explores the subjects reaction to the premium trade—off.
We consider three different subsamples. The first one, labelled as Addicts, consists
of 32 patients under psychological treatment for pathological gambling. The second sub-
sample, labelled as Victims, consists of 30 spouses of individuals belonging to the first
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subsample. The third is our control population, it consists of 20 Normal subjects. In
fact, Sabater & Georgantzís [15] and Georgantzís et al. [8] provide us with a much larger
data set obtained with “normal” student-subjects faced with the same task under both
hypothetical and real motivation (money or classroom grades). However, given the age
difference between students and the two focus groups in our study, we have created a new
“normal” sample for the sake of comparability.
In our experiement, no subject in any subsample received any money or other real
reward. They made decisions to win hypothetical money. We chose this procedure because
of ethical reasons. Indeed, we cannot offer to play real reward lotteries to individuals
recovering from pathological gambling. We had to apply the same methodology to the
other two subsamples because we wanted the three of them to be comparable to each
other.
Interestingly, addicts’ on average reported higher degree of risk aversion than normal
individuals. However, victims exhibit even higher risk aversion. Furthermore, a large
percentage of victims, around 70%, refused to take any risk at all.
A second salient result of this research is that both addicts and vitims are insensitive
to increases in expected hypothetical rewards, while normal subjects take higher risks
when rewards increase.
Behavior of normal individuals, meaning low risk aversion, can be justified by the
hypothetical payoff structure. Thus, higher risk aversion shown by both addicts and
victims becomes surprising and have to be explained by the specificity of the subsample.
Both the risk aversion result and the extreme insensitivity of victims and addicts towards
prizes encouraging risk taking are compatible with the hypothesis that people who have
suffered directly or indirectly the consequences of pathological gambling declare to be
unwilling to play any lottery.
In Section 2 we further discuss our objectives and hypothesis. In Section 3 we explain
the experimental design. Section 4 summarizes the results and Section 5 contains con-
clusions. The appendix presents an English translation of the instructions including our
lottery panel.
4
2 Objectives & Hypothesis
Our intention is to study individual attitudes towards risk. However, our viewpoint differs
from previous articles. Our analysis is focused on individuals who have, or have had, a
problematic relation with gambling. That is, people diagnosed as pathological gamblers
on one side or, their spouses on the other. There are some precedents of experimental
economics research done using “special subject pools”. For instance, the article of Battalio
et al. [2] reports the results of a token economy experiment run with 38 patients of Central
Islip State Hospital. More recently there is notice of this type of research conducted by
Ernst Fehr with schizophrenics and Rosemarie Nagel with Alzheimer patients.
Objective 1: To estimate a risk aversion parameter for the pathological gamblers and
compare it with normal people.
Notice that, besides the players in our additcts subject are not active gamblers yet.
However, psychiatrists consider them pathological gamblers forever. Then, we should
consider this part of the analuysis as an exploratory study of this population. In sum, we
check if they behave as normal people or, as pathological gamblers, they show any special
feature.
Objective 2: To estimate and compare a risk aversion parameter for the pathological
gamblers’ spouses.
Again, it is not clear how victims are going to behave towards risk. On one hand they
are people who have not been diagnosed as pathological gamblers. So, they should be
indistinguishable from normals. However, they lived and suffered a pathological gambling
environment. There is evidence in psychology about how close relatives’ behavior affect
people. This is well known for alcoholic relatives.
So, this fact might affect risk attitudes of victims making them to ’hate’ gambling
and then rejecting to take risks. Jimenez [9] analyzes risk aversion using experimental
economics techniques for people coming from two different environments —family back-
grounds: Urban and rural. She found no significant difference.
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3 Experimental Design
Our main objective is to explore the effect of gambling on risk attitudes. We compare
three different sub-samples: addicts, victims and normals.
We run an experimental session at Hotel El Pilar in La Carlota (Córdoba, Spain) in
November 2003. The subject pool in this session consisted of members of the “Asociación
Cordobesa de Jugadores en Rehabilitación”1 (ACOJER). This is an association in which
members are compulsive gambling players medically supervised. We run two treatments
on this session:
i. In the first one (“addicts” treatment) all the subjects were compulsive gamblers belong-
ing to the association. Thirty three people participated in the addicts treatment.
Nevertheless, we got only 32 independent observations because one person refused
to play the game at all.
ii. In the second (“victims” treatment) subjects were players’ relatives or couples, there-
fore victims of their compulsive behavior. We got 30 independent observations in
the victims treatment.
We did not pay any money to subjects in both addicts and victims treatments, they
were just hypothetical, because of ethical reasons.
To compare results arising from that specific population with subjects not affected
by gambling we run another experimental session at the Instituto de Estudios Sociales
Avanzados (CSIC). This is a research center also located in Córdoba. We made a public
call for an hypothetical experiment and we got 20 volunteers.
iii. The third group (“normals” treatment) were IESA-CSIC staff. This subsample was
prefered over college students because of a higher homogenity on ageing and similar
geographic origins, see Table1.
1A direct translation might be: Cordobesian Association for Alcoholics in Rehabilitation.
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Table 1: Demographic Data
Victims Addicts Normals
Age (Years) 41, 2 42, 06 33, 35
Male (%) 13, 3% 90, 6% 60%
n 32 30 20
Notice there is a higher proportion of males on the addicts sample than both on
victims or nomal. Some studies indicate that males are less risk averse than females (see
Jiménez [9]; Olsen & Cox [11], and specially Byrnes et al. [3]). So, this might introduce a
bias in the comparison between addicts and normals, making addicts even less risk averse.
Victims are mostly women. In this case, the possible bias would favor a less risky observed
behavior in favor of victims.
Our experimental design is based on slightly revised version of the ternary lotteries
approach (see Roth and Malouf [14] or Murningham, Roth & Schoumaker [10] among
others).
Let a lottery (p,X) imply a probability p or earning X (else nothing). Consider a
continuun of such lotteries contructed to compesate a riskier options with increase in the
expected payoff. Formally, each continuun of lotteries will be defined by the pair (c, r)
corresponding, respectively, to the certain payoff c above which the expected payoff is
incresed by r times the probability of earning nothing. Therefore,
pX(p) = c+ (1− p)r =⇒ X(p) = c+ (1− p)r
p
.
In order to simplify the decision problem faced by our subjects, we have used lottery
panels each one of which corresponds to a dicrete version of a continuun of loteries. Figure
1 is the actual choice panel that experimental subjects received. It presents the payoffs
corresponding to the favourable outcome of each lottery whose probability p is given at
the first row of each each panel; the second row shows the payoffs and the third is the
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place where subject mark his preferred choice. These panels had been constructed using
c = 1 and r = 0.1, 1, 5, 10. Each subject is asked to choose the most preferred lottery for
each panel.
Figure 1: Lottery Panels
By inspection the farther right the subject chooses, the less risk averse he is, whereas
risk neutral (risk loving) subjects would choose p = 0.1 in all panels.
4 Results
First, we study how each population behave in the referred panels, that is, a between—
subjects analysis. Next figures 2a—c illustrate the frequency of each population throughout
each panel of lotteries. We can see how a very high percentage of victims (dashed line
with black dots) decide on the safe lottery (p = 1) regardless the panel.
We can get an indication also of how the normals (continous line) is the most risk
taking subsample (see, for example, the high percentage of people choosing p = 0.1).
Finally, in between we can find the addicts (dash line with square markers).
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(b) Panel 2 (d) Panel 4
Now we check whether results are statistically different between subsamples in each
panal. These results are supported by a series of Kruskal-Wallis andMedian non-parametric
tests for k = 3 unrelated samples. The null hypothesis says that the average (or the me-
dian) is the same in all the three subsamples (victims, addicts and normals). We perform
the same analysis in each panel. Table 2 summarizes these tests.
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Table 2: Between Subjects Analysis
Panel 1 Panel 2 Panel 3 Panel 4
Kruskal-W χ2. 15.48 27.62 30.74 29.87
p− value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Median χ2 16.82 25.31 34.00 35.20
p− value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Both series of tests report identical results: Samples are not drawn from the same
population. Neither the average nor the median can be considered the same along the
three sub-samples in any lottery.Each group reported a statistically different behavior.
If we consider the average behavior of each sample across panels as our risk aversion
parameter we get2 (victims = 0.867, addicts = 0.560 and normals = 0.385). Therefore we
can conclude that,
Result 1: Addicts are willing to take less risk than normal individuals.
Result 1b: However, the large majority of victims reports themselves unwilling to take
any risk at all.
Now we explore within—subjects behavior across lotteries. Next figures, 2a-c show
cumulative distributions across panels for each subsample. Here we can observe how
behavior does not seem to vary across panels for victims (2-a) and maybe for addicts
(2-b) while normals (2-c) seem to behave differently across lottery panels.
2To compute this value we use the mean of the four average of each sample in each panel.
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(c) Panel 3: Normals
Our tests also support what figures indicate. We now test whether there is any dif-
ference across panels within each population, that is, we will check how sensitive each
subsample is to the risk-return tradeoff.
Victims: Clearly, we do not observe any variation among panels; on average their
choices are 0.85 (panel 1, hereafter p1), 0.89 (p2), 0.87 (p3) and 0.86 (p4). Both the
Friedman (χ23 = 2.65; p = 0.44) and Kendall (χ
2
3 = 2.65; p = 0.44) tests for k = 4 related
samples do not reject the null hypothesis of equal distribution, then all samples are drawn
from the same population. Hence, victims did not react to the risk-return tradeoff.
Addicts: The constant average behavior observed in the previous group is also com-
mon within addicts. The average behavior does not varies across panels: 0.59 (p1), 0.59
(p2), 0.53 (p3) and 0.53 (p4). Both the Friedman (χ23 = 2.62; p = 0.45) and Kendall
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(χ23 = 2.62; p = 0.45) do not reject the null. Hence, addicts did not varied their behavior
across panels.
Normals: In contrast to the other samples, these normal individuals reacted to the
risk-return tradeoff. In the first panel (mean = 0.52) they behaved similarly to the former
sample (addicts), however they varied their choices when they observed an increasing
return. In the following panels, average clearly falls: 0, 38 (p2), 0, 33 (p3) and 0, 30 (p4).
In contrast to victims and addicts, both the Friedman (χ23 = 8.84; p = 0.03) and Kendall
(χ23 = 8.84; p = 0.03) reject the null, so normals did varied their behavior across panels.
Where these differences arise? From panel 1 to the following panels significant dif-
ferences appear [Z-Wilcoxon tests for p1 vs. p2: −1.97 (p = 0.04); p1 vs. p3: −2.24
(p = 0.02); p1 vs. p4: −2.52 (p = 0.01)]. However, the remaining comparisons do not
support any difference [Z-Wilcoxon tests for p2 vs. p3: −1.26 (p = 0.20); p3 vs. p4:
−0.59 (p = 0.55); p2 vs. p4: −1.64 (p = 0.10)]. Then, subjects are only sensitive to large
increases in returns.
Result 2: Both addicts and victims maintain their choices invariant across different sce-
narios concerning the risk-return tradeoff. However normal subjects are sensitive to
large return variations.
Finally, we study the determinants of individual decisions across the four panels. To
perform this analysis we are required to define, first, our dependent variable. In order
to extract the maximum level of information we define 4 possible dependent variables:




pi,j; i = 1, ..., 82;
j = 1, ..., 4); (2) the choice on panel 1 of each i−individual (P 1i ); (3) we define sensitivity
to the difference between choices in panel 1 and panel 4, Sensitivity (Si)=|P 4i − P 1i |; (4)
Variance (σ2) of the four choices of each individual.
The set of independent variables we used is the following. Addict, which takes value
1 if the subject is a pathological gambler and 0 otherwise; Affected, which takes value 1
if the subject is directly (or indirectly) affected by gambling and 0 otherwise; Age; and
Male (0 otherwise). Also, previous dependent variables are considered as independent.
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Columns 1 to 5 in table 3 show several estimations. The ∗ symbol illustrates the level
of significance where ∗ denote significant for α < 1%; ∗∗ for α < 5%; ∗ ∗ ∗ for α < 10%;
and “no-sign” means not significant.
The first estimation (column 1) analyses the effect of gambling and individual features
on (average) risk choice. As expected those subject who are affected by gambling are
willing to take less risk. However this is not completely true because those subjects
affected but with a compulsive gambling pathology (addicts) are willing to take more
risk. Interestingly male are willing to take more risk than females and older people than
younger, although this last parameter is nearly marginal.
The introduction of any measure of sensitivity to the risk-return tradeoff in the spec-
ification of the equation does not increase our knowledge. Column 2 show that neither
sensitivity nor variance are significant.
Columns 3 estimates the same model than 1 with the only difference that the depen-
dent variable is P 1 instead of bP . Results are not so different to those reported previously
and do not need further explanation.
Result 3: Belonging to the Affected group increases risk aversion
Result 3b: Addiction and male decrease risk aversion.
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Table 3: Individual behavior
bP bP P1 Sensitivity σ2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Addict −0.26∗ −0.27∗ −0.22∗ +0.14∗ +0.03∗
Affected +0.51∗ +0.51∗ +0.38∗ −0.30∗ −0.06∗
Age −0.00∗∗ −0.00∗∗ −0.00∗∗ +0.00 +0.00




c +0.63∗ +0.64∗ +0.85∗ +0.04 −0.02
R
2
40.8 39.7 26.4 18.2 18.0
But, are these variables able to explain why subjects react (or not) to the risk-return
tradeoff? Columns 4 and 5 give an interesting picture about this. Using sensitivity as
dependent variable or the directly the variance as dependent, the message is the same:
those subjects who are affected by gambling are not very sensitive to the risk-return trade
off but addicts are!.
Furthermore, those subjects who chosen low-risky lotteries in panel 1 are willing to
react positively to the risk-return tradeoff.
Result 4: The risk-return tradeoff is diminished by Affected but enlarged by both Ad-
dicts and first (safe) choice.
5 Conclusions
Thus paper explores attitudes toward risk among two very salient populations: patho-
logical gamblers under psychological treatment (“addicts”) and gamblers’ relatives (“vic-
tims”). We compare these samples to normal (as far as gambling is considered) indi-
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viduals. To make this study we use variations of ternary lotteries. Our main results
are:
• Addicts are willing to take less risk than normal individuals.
• The large majority of victims reports themselves unwilling to take any risk at all.
• Both addicts and victims maintain their choices invariant across different scenarios
concerning the risk-return tradeoff.
• In contrast, normals behave as expected.
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